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Abstract: The behavior/structure methodological dichotomy as locus of scientific inquiry 
is closely related to the issue of modeling and theory change in scientific explanation. 
Given that the traditional tension between structure and behavior in scientific modeling is 
likely here to stay, considering the relevant precedents in the history of ideas could help us 
better understand this theoretical struggle. This better understanding might open up 
unforeseen possibilities and new instantiations, particularly in what concerns the proposed 
technological modification of the human condition. The sequential structure of this paper is 
twofold. The contribution of three philosophers better known in the humanities than in the 
study of science proper are laid out. The key theoretical notions interweaving the whole 
narrative are those of mechanization, constructability and simulation. They shall provide 
the conceptual bridge between these classical thinkers and the following section. Here, a 
panoramic view of three significant experimental approaches in contemporary scientific 
research is displayed, suggesting that their undisclosed ontological premises have deep 
roots in the Western tradition of the humanities. This ontological lock between core 
humanist ideals and late research in biology and nanoscience is ultimately suggested as 
responsible for pervasively altering what is canonically understood as “human”. 
Keywords: Duns Scotus; Giambattista Vico; Francis Bacon; simulation; artificiality; 
machine; cybernetics; Culture Wars; nanotechnology; transhumanism 
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1. Philosophical Precedents for the Scientific (Explanatory) Notions of Modeling, Mechanism 
and Simulation 
1.1. Duns Scotus: Continuum between Physical Entities and the Divine Being 
After several centuries of having Aristotle’s works unavailable to Europe, the twelfth century 
witnessed a revival of Aristotelian philosophy. After a millennium of a Christian philosophy  
largely based upon Platonisminheriting at times its subsequent relative contempt for the physical 
realmSt. Thomas Aquinas, a member of the newly formed mendicant Order of St. Dominic, 
embarked upon the major task of relocating the fundamentals of Christianity upon the newly 
rediscovered Aristotelian writings. This displacement created waves of tension throughout 
Christendom. There were deep concerns regarding the outcome of combining the Christian faith with a 
philosophy which, even if acknowledging the existence of the Divine, it did it in a way that could 
forever remove it away from a human relational intimacy—Aristotle’s god was not a personal god; 
even less one that would become man. Aquinas was eventually reivindicated by the Church, which 
three centuries later placed his Summa Theologica besides the Bible on the altarthe only book ever 
that enjoyed such honorin the closing Mass for the Council of Trent, when it defined its position 
against the Protestant revolt. 
One of the prominent figures who relentlessly attacked Aquinas’ ideas at the time was Blessed Duns 
Scotus, a member of the order started by Saint Francis of Assisi. Both Doctors of the Catholic Church, 
(Angelicus—Aquinas—and Subtilis—Scotus) their orders were founded just a century apart. They 
embodied a profound reform of the Church at the time, accentuating poverty as a charisma, and it 
quickly grew large all over Europe. During the lifetime of both philosophers, the mendicant feature of 
both orders gave increasing space to an emphasis on education, eventually founding universities with 
their distinctive character. The famed rivalry between the Franciscans and the Dominicans (the first 
being somewhat prone to heresy and the second to orthodoxy) has arguably been somewhat 
exaggerated, although it is widely recognized that each order characterized the two major flavors of 
European universities for centuries to come—one under the light of an Aristotelian pre-Modern 
realism (Dominicans), the other under a more Platonic take on reality, with heavy leniencies towards 
mysticism (Franciscans) ([1], chapter 2). 
Scotus was concerned about Aquinas’ understanding of concepts when these would ultimately 
predicates of God (divine attributes). For Aquinas, when we speak of God as being good, we actually 
mean this “goodness” in an equivocal way, not in the same way in which we use it when we refer to, 
for example, humans. The goodness of God can be only analogically related to that of humansor of 
creation, health, etc. Aquinas clearly emphasized the transcendent nature of God, and even if there are 
cues in nature that can eventually lead us to Him (as in his famed Quinque Viae), we ultimately know 
more about what He is not than what He is. 
Scotus saw a problem right there. For him, negative knowledge was ultimately not knowledge at all. 
This was just the start of the danger that was to come after following Aristotle. He feared that if 
Aquinas had it his way, the human capability of reaching God would be truncated, and ultimately 
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metaphysics might even cease to exist.1 Furthermore, Aquinas would think of “eing” as not necessarily 
entailing “existence” (God is, more than merely exists, since “existence”, being contingent, 
necessitates a “being” to give its very “existence” in the first place). For Scotus this equivocality could 
have a catastrophic effect, given the nature of human intelligence. The primal object of the human 
intellect is “being inasmuch as being” (ens inquantum ens). That entails that if something is, it will 
necessarily fall within the realm of the intelligible. There is no being without existence. To affirm the 
contrary would allow for the possibility of a being beyond intelligibility, which could lead to the denial 
of existence of the Ultimate Being. Hence for Scotus there is a semantic continuum in our predication 
of the attributes of a beingincluding Godfor otherwise there could be the case of a 
beingincluding Godequivocally referred to, and thus removed beyond the grasp of our intellectual 
might. In his own words: 
And lest there be a dispute about the name “univocation”, I designate that concept univocal 
which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm or deny it of one and the same 
thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term of a 
syllogism, so that wherever two extremes are united by a middle term that is one in this 
way, we may conclude to the union of two extremes among themselves ([3], p. 20).2 
For Scotus, in predicating, say the “cleanliness” of a man, we can refer to the moral aspect of his 
persona or to his physical, bodily realm—among other levels of qualified existence. So one can say 
that such man is clean and not clean, without committing contradiction, given that one is applying 
cleanliness to different aspects, and still maintaining the univocity of being (univocatio entis) 
regarding cleanliness. The meaning of the noun (or adjective) is the same for both cases, but the 
variation occurs in the way or degree in which this notion is applied. When thinking of God’s 
attributes, “the extremes united by means of a middle term possessing such a unity are themselves 
united with each other”, so that we say about Him as being good in an infinite way, but of creatures as 
being good in a finite, fallible way. The same is said of being: the radical opposite to nothingness is 
beingeven if this being can be infinite (God) or finite (everything else). Regardless of the way in 
which being opposes to nothingness, it is the same notion of being at work here, either applied to God 
or His creatures. This ontological continuum3 should warrant our finite capacity of reaching the 
Infinite One. After all, our knowledge would differ from the Creator’s in a manner of degree, not 
kindpace Thomas Aquinas. This Scotian ontological bridge established between the physical and the 
non-physical would re-emerge much later under a technological umbrella, as we shall see in part II. 
  
                                                 
1  Scotus’ concern antecedes Immanuel Kant’s questioning of the possibility of metaphysics as a science by four centuries. 
Kant would later dispatch his famous ultimatum: “All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended 
from their occupations until they shall have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic cognitions a priori 
possible?” ([2], Preamble: Section 5.) 
2  Ordinatio I, distinctio. 3, part 1, quaestio. 2, numero 26. 
3  Certainly the idea of a continuum as the default state of affairs of reality was already perused by the Ancient Greeks. In 
the realm of the inanimate, it was understood that natura abhorret vacuum. Among living entities, a careful continuity 
in “how rightly Nature orders generation in regular gradation” ([4], pp. II, 1) was recognized. 
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1.2. Francis Bacon: Mechanical arts against the Epistemic Darkness set by Original Sin 
The pervading notion in Christendom of humans having been conceived in the “image and likeness 
of God”,4  one of the tenets of faith that operated behind Scotus’ attack of Aquinas, evolved in 
increasingly liberal ways the next two hundred years. The beginning of the sixteenth century signaled 
the formal (theoretical and then political) rebellion against the Church in Europe. Tradition has it that 
the Ninety-Five Thesis on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences, was nailed on the front door of the 
castle church of Wittenberg, by the Augustinian priest Martin Luther in 1507. This revolt eventually 
amounted to the biggest breakaway in the body of Christianity after the Great Schism of the eleventh 
century. Five hundred years later, the Protestant “reform” commands much scholarship;5 it is not my 
intention to address it here. What is relevant, however, is the evolution of the notion of imago Dei 
within the ranks of those who fostered the Scientific Revolution. 
Although a plethora of non-religious circumstances were leading to the historic event, the 
reformers’ attack against the Church was symbolically triggered by the lack of clarification, on the part 
of the Church, regarding what is referred to in the English title of Luther’s manifesto, namely, “the 
power and efficacy of indulgences”.6 During the ensuing struggle between the reformers and Rome, 
the former gradually found scriptural passages that would allegedly justify their independence from the 
Hierarchy in particular and the Holy Orders7 in general. The Hierarchy (conformed by the bishops, 
cardinals and patriarchs) is the only entity that can provide the sacrament of Holy Orders. Once a 
society gets rid of it, priests could not be ordained, and the rest of the sacraments, which priests have 
the mandate to deliver, cannot be provided. We would be in front of a sacrament-less Christianity, 
which is what the reformers were afterin order to render the Church effectively useless. 
                                                 
4  “God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27, NAB). 
5  Arguably, Western civilization got wedged in such a way that it never healed. The instantiation of this division was 
eventually settled, embodied on the one side by those countries who remained faithful to Rome (mostly southern 
Europe) and on the other those who did not (Anglo-Saxony and northern Europe)—a cosmological split that was 
naturally extended to their respective colonies. Eisenstein reports this rift as follows: 
Sixteenth-century heresy and schism shattered Christendom so completely that even after religious warfare had 
ended, ecumenical movements led by men of good will could not put all the pieces together again. Not only were 
there too many splinter groups, separatists, and independent sects who regarded a central church government as 
incompatible with true faith; but the main lines of cleavage had been extended across continents and carried 
overseas along with Bibles and breviaries. Within a few generations, the gap between Protestant and Catholic had 
widened sufficiently to give rise to contrasting literary cultures and lifestyles. Long after Christian theology had 
ceased to provoke wars, Americans as well as Europeans were separated from each other by invisible barriers that 
are still with us today ([5], pp. 172–73). 
6  The actual title was Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum. 
7  With the sacrament of Holy Orders one is “ordered” a presbyter (a priest), a deacon or a bishop. In the case of a priest, it 
institutes in that person ad perpetuum the capability of providing the other six sacraments. The provision of this one 
sacrament is reserved solely to the bishop. “Since the sacrament of Holy Orders is the sacrament of the apostolic 
ministry, it is for the bishops as the successors of the apostles to hand on the “gift of the Spirit”, the “apostolic line”. 
Validly ordained bishops, i.e., those who are in the line of apostolic succession, validly confer the three degrees of the 
sacrament of Holy Orders” ([6], para. 1576). 
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Martin Luther held a profoundly dark outlook regarding what remained of human nature after the 
Fall. Whereas for the Catholic Church this Fall deeply “corrupted” our nature, for Protestantism it 
irreparably “shattered” it. For Catholicism, this wounded nature could still be healedvia the 
sacramentssince the destruction was not complete. For Protestantism, we are so completely damned, 
that only Christand Him alonecan save us. However, our underlying nature remains ultimately 
broken. Simul iustus ad pecator (Simultaneusly justified and sinner) Luther would proclaim. 
This shift carried existential and epistemological issues. For fifteen centuries there was a relatively 
unbroken certainty that the seven sacraments were specifically instituted by Jesus Christ, for us to 
attain self-realization in this life and salvation in the next one. That was never denied by the earlier 
Eastern Christian split of the eleventh centurythe mentioned Great Schism. The sacramental 
institution just “made sense”, having in mind the inescapable catastrophe depicted in Genesis 3. Until 
we accept the redemption given by Christ, which is literally effectuated via the reception of the 
sacraments, the Great Fall inherently dooms human existenceincluding our epistemic capacities. 
Thus the human sacramental participation of divine grace allegedly heals our fallen natureallowing 
us to return to the “essence of humanity,” lost as a consequence of Original Sin. 
Such was the Christian view of man until then. However, now, given the post-Reformation absence 
of sacraments, an anxious inquiry regarding the scope and limits of human capabilities quickly set in. 
Prima facie, given the absolutely totalizing nature of the Fall, any hopeful human endeavor is right 
from the start destined to crash. Specifically, accounts of the now lost Adamian wisdom, which 
enjoyed pre-Fall super-human intellectual and cognitive capabilities, begun to flourish. Scriptura Sola, 
now without the tutelary guidance of the Church and written in vernacular languages, allegedly gave 
accounts of the encyclopedic knowledge that Adam enjoyed, e.g., in calling creatures by their name. A 
veil of hopelessness seemed to rear its head for the possibilities of knowledge, and indeed for any 
significant outcome from human experience whatsoever [7]. 
The strongest voice that defied this looming prospect arguably was the one to which we attribute 
having theoretically fostered the Scientific Revolution: Francis Bacon. Immanuel Kant tellingly 
opened his Critique of Pure Reason with a quote from Baron Verulam (Bacon’s honorific title). Kant 
does this in order to highlight Bacon’s role in the new science, having “made the proposal that partly 
prompted this road’s discovery, and partlyin so far as some were already on the trail of this 
discoveryinvigorated it further” ([8], Bxii). Strong words that found echo in the copious amount of 
scholarship on this author, the alleged articulator of the scientific method for early Modern science. 
One aspect of Bacon’s work, however, that has arguably received less attention, was the main reason 
behind the construction of the new science in the first placenamely, the retrieval of the lost epistemic 
capabilities that humans were endowed with in virtue of having being created in imago Dei.8 
Such relative absence in the scholarship is all the more surprising once we realize that “for Francis 
Bacon, the reform of learning was not a secular pursuit, but a divine mandate” ([9], p. 51). Indeed, 
                                                 
8  Peter Harrison would extend the influence of the awareness of a doomed humanity vis a vis Original Sin beyond 
Bacon’s motivations and into the very birth of Modern science, advancing that “the biblical narrative of the Fall played 
a far more direct role in the development of early Modern knowledge—both in England and on the Continent—than has 
often been assumed, and that competing strategies for the advancement of knowledge in the XVII century were closely 
related to different assessments of the Fall and of its impact upon the human mind” ([7], p. 240). 
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Bacon did not mince words for clearly pointing out that Original Sin catastrophically affected man’s 
intellectual capabilities, removing the mastery over nature that Adam once enjoyed. In The New 
Organon, he asserts that “[f]or man by the fall fell at the same from his state of innocence and from his 
dominion over creation” ([10], p. 189). The allusion to Genesis 3 is clear in his understanding of the 
dramatic loss we underwent due to Adam’s fault. The Devil, represented in Genesis by a serpent, 
introduced darkness and confusion in the human mind forever. In The Great Instauration, the sharp 
decrease in our intellectual capabilities is sorely lamented by Bacon in a Trinitarian prayer, which asks 
for “illumination”, one of the Gifts pertaining to the Holy Spirit: “Lastly, that knowledge being now 
discharged of that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, 
we may not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity” ([11], p. 74). A grim 
depiction of our epistemic panorama is indeed laid out. 
However, there is a way out from cognitive darkness. Again in the New Organon, after referring to 
both our losses of innocence and of mastery over nature triggered by Original Sin, Bacon gives a 
glimpse of hope: “Both of these losses, however, can even in this life be in some part repaired; the 
former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences.” ([10], p. 189). Our intellectual capacity is 
corrupted, that much is clear. Hence we need a way to put it in check, to rely on something solid. 
Reliance on our “natural lights” is out of the question, due to inherited state of contamination. The way 
to get rid of the “idols”9 of the mind will thus entails a return to hard reality. However, not just in any 
way. The Greeks were faithful realists, but their appreciation of nature, even with powerful insights, 
did not produce growing knowledge. Their experience as great philosophers but not great scientists 
stands as a warning for us: 
Signs also are to be drawn from the increase and progress of systems and sciences. For 
what is founded on nature grows and increases; while what is founded on opinion varies 
but increases not. If, therefore, those doctrines had not plainly been like a plant torn up 
from its roots, but had remained attached to the womb of nature and continued to draw 
nourishment from her, that could never have come to pass which we have seen now for 
twice a thousand years; namely, that the sciences stand where they did and remain almost 
in the same condition, receiving no noticeable increase, but on the contrary, thriving most 
under their first founder, and then declining ([10], p. 113). 
Thus there is an element missing. We have to indeed observe nature, but not as a passive gatherer, 
accumulating data and speculating about possible connections and causes, but rather making up 
situations that would force the studied objects to behave in such way that we could satisfy our 
previously construed questions. Immanuel Kant, who appropriately understood the Baconian dictum, 
captured well Bacon’s suggestion for pressing nature, since Bacon himself was allegedly inspired by 
the torturous questioning of witnesses in courtwhich often provide surprising and fruitful 
outcomes. In the words of Kant, “reason must indeed approach nature in order to be instructed by it; 
yet it must do so not in the capacity of a pupil who lets the teacher tell him whatever the teacher wants, 
but in the capacity of an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer the questions that he puts 
to them” ([8], Bxiii). 
                                                 
9  Idols of the tribe (race), of the cave (individual), of the marketplace (language) and of the theatre (authority) ([10],  
pp. 95ff). 
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Making allusion to the Ancient Greeks one more time, this time specifically to Aristotle, Bacon 
pointed out the crucial difference it makes to “push” nature into fitting inquiring categories, declaring 
that “in the business of life, a man’s disposition and the secret workings of his mind and affections are 
better discovered when he is in trouble than at other times, so likewise the secrets of nature reveal 
themselves more readily under the vexations of art than when they go their own way” ([10], p. 130). 
The Greek experience, in contrast… 
is the opposite of what happens with the mechanical arts, which are based on nature and 
the light of experience: they (as long as they find favor with people) continually thrive and 
grow, having a special kind of spirit in them, so that they are at first rough and ready,  
then manageable, from then onwards made smoothly convenient by use—and always 
growing ([10], p. 113). 
One cannot help but stopping for a moment to admire the brilliance of the suggestion. Our fallible 
intellectual capabilities get anchored in physical substrata, but not imposing its faults nor letting itself 
be paved upon by nature’s might. Instead, a reciprocal relation is formed, whose results let themselves 
get noticed by a growth of knowledge. When this constructive conflict is not present in the inquiry, the 
fate of the Greeks stands as a warning. The “mechanical arts” provide a key element of solidity, whose 
determinism (in so far as mechanical) acts as a reliable platform for our otherwise weakened reason to 
perform its questioning tasks. The notion of experimentum crucis, which constituted a methodological 
pillar for subsequent developments in science, was used as a basic element upon which much of 
scientific thinking regarding reliable parameters for experimentation was done. However, one could be 
misled regarding the ultimate aim of this historical progress if we would to take in consideration 
Bacon’s primal reason behind his proposal to reshape scientific inquiry: 
[I]t is not the pleasure of curiosity, nor the quiet of resolution, nor the raising of the spirit, 
nor victory of wit, nor faculty of speech, nor lucre of profession, nor ambition of honour or 
fame, nor inablement for business, that are the true ends of knowledge; some of these being 
more worthy than other, though all inferior and degenerate: but it is a restitution and 
reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and power (for whensoever he shall be 
able to call the creatures by their true names he shall again command them) which he had 
in his first state of creation ([12], p. 188). 
The Protestant Reformation’s role in the Scientific Revolution pivots around a concerted philosophical 
effort to overcome the epistemological crippling effects introduced by Original Sin—effects only 
brought to the fore after the epistemic “antidote” (the sacraments) were no longer available. Baron 
Verulam’s intention behind his revolutionary proposal is laid out clearly: to employ the “new science” 
as the way out of the cognitive darkness inherited from our sinful first fathers. Bacon’s longing for an 
Adamian nature that would excel in epistemic abilitiesnow lost—might finally find rest, thanks to 
the restitutional capabilities of the newly formed “mechanical arts”. Experimentation that fostered a 
mechanical explanation became the hardcore signature of early Modern scienceepitomized in the 
great names of Galileo, Newton, Boyle and even J. C. Maxwell at some point.10 However, the set of 
                                                 
10  It is widely acknowledged that J. C. Maxwell held on to visually mechanical explanations of “action at a distance” in 
electromagnetism until the visual heuristics were no longer needed ([13], chapter 3). 
Humanities 2014, 3 747 
 
 
interrogations that would construct the backdrop for the devised experiment would all constitute, once 
the results are obtained, a model of a portion of realitya phenomenon’s identified patterns of 
reaction to our experimentation. The nature of this model generated itself inquiries, and its 
constitution, aims and even struggles were pondered in the centuries to come. The aspect of 
constructability that a mechanical model inherently possess would go on to inform realms that were 
perhaps not foreseen by Bacon himselfas we will see below. However, first, let us explore one more 
instance of the evolution of this “mechanical epistemology”. This time it came from one of Bacon’s 
most fervent admirers, two centuries later. 
1.3. Giambatista Vico: Secular Creatio and Constructability as Criterion of Truth 
Canonically known after La Scienza Nuova (a treatise on how to lead nations that was to be 
regarded later as the foundational text for philosophy of history), Giambattista Vico’s early writings 
clearly indicated how dramatically important were Bacon’s insights for his own era. In an 
autobiography where the Italian philosopher refers to himself in the third person, he speaks of his 
discovery of Bacon. He recounts that “from his De augmentis scientiarum Vico [himself] concluded 
that, as Plato is the prince of Greek wisdom, and the Greeks have no Tacitus, so Romans and Greeks 
alike have no Bacon” ([14], p. 139). Vico, himself a Catholic, castigated Baco’s infamous vicious 
attacks against Rome, but trying to balance things out, he gave the hostile Anglican philosopher its fair 
due, saying of him that “without professional and sectarian bias, save for a few things which offend the 
Catholic religion, he did justice to all the sciences” ([14], p. 139). Indeed Vico acknowledged Bacon’s 
original contribution to scientific methodology, which would itself later reverberate into an 
augmentation of empirical knowledge. 
Vico’s metaphysics, developed years before La Scienzaand upon which the latter was eventually 
basedhad a strong philological accent. He advanced the argument that in the case of the Latin 
language, key linguistic terms had been formed out of philosophical insights rather than vulgar 
tradesindeed “derived from some inward learning rather than from the vernacular usage of the 
people” ([15], p. 37). Vico engaged into etymological archaeologies to bring into the open the deep 
meaning of certain metaphysically dense concepts. As a way of guiding examples, he brought up the 
verb intelligere, which means both “to read perfectly” and “to have plain knowledge”; the verb 
cogitare, which means “to think” and “to gather”; and the noun ratio, which means both the 
recognition of mathematical proportions and man’s endowed reason. Most tellingly, verum and factum 
were at the time interchangeable (convertible), as it is shown in the Latin adagio verum esse ipsum 
factum: “the truth is what is made, itself”or, the truth is precisely what is done.11 This assertion 
carries some immediate epistemological and ontological consequences. For starters, the only one who 
can fully know is God, for Heand He alonecreates its own object of knowledge. 
Before casting Vico’s etymology-based metaphysics under a negative light, one could be reminded 
that he is not alone in this understanding of divine knowledge as the only one which both perfectly 
knows something and creates precisely that “something” while knowing it. Indeed Vico’s views on this 
are not dissimilar from that of probably the most representative philosopher of the Modern Era. 
                                                 
11  “For the Latins, verum (the true) and factum (what is made) are interchangeable, or to use the customary language of the 
Schools, they are convertible” ([15], p. 45). 
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Immanuel Kant, roughly a contemporary of Vico, had a very clearly exclusive adscription of the 
faculty of “intellectual intuition” to God alone. For Kant, we are endowed with “sensible intuition” 
(space and time being its pure forms); our faculty is passive, receiving raw sensible material from the 
thing as it is presented to usall of which would construct the uniquely Kantian understanding of 
“experience”, which then will be ordered by our intellect. This is within the core of the “Trascendental 
Aesthetic” in the Critique of Pure Reason. Our intuitus derivativus does not create the object of our 
intellect. In contrast, in the case of God’s intuitus originarious, to think about something is to create 
that something: 
Our kind of intuition is called sensible because it is not original. I.e., it is not such that 
through this intuition itself the existence of its object is given (the latter being a kind of 
intuition that, as far as we can see, can belong only to the original Being)…intellectual 
intuition seems to belong solely to the original Being, and never to a being that is 
dependent as regards both its existence and intuition (an intuition that determines that 
being’s existence by reference to given objects) ([8], B72). 
Vico’s take on truth as convertible to that which is built, is mindful of Bacon’s emphasis on our 
need for reliance on experimentation for extracting the answers from nature. However, the line of 
thought that goes from Vico’s claim regarding the verum factum to Bacon’s need for experimenting 
with reality needs some explanation. God knows everything totally and perfectly because all things 
that constitute this “everything” are already in Him; humans, on the other hand, are external to these 
things—we have a superficial grasp of them, since they are not internal to us: 
God reads all the elements of things whether inner or outer, because He contains and 
disposes them in order, whereas the human mind, because it is limited and external to 
everything else that is not itself, is confined to the outside edges of things only and, hence, 
can never gather them all together ([15], p. 46). 
This nature of ultimate knowledge has a bearing on science “in general”, namely, both for God 
and humans. Science is “knowledge of the genus or mode by which a thing is made; and by this  
very knowledge the mind makes the thing, because in knowing it puts together the elements of that 
thing” ([15], p. 46). Scientific knowledge, thus, implies a creative process. One knows in the very act 
of creating. Again, only God fully knows, because He creates. Having said that, there is a realm where 
we in fact fully know, creating the very object that we know: mathematics: “Just as he who occupies 
himself with geometry is, in his world of figures, a god (so to speak), so God Almighty is, in his world 
of spirits and bodies, a geometer (so to speak)” ([16], p. 66). It is in mathematical knowledge where we 
find the closest resemblance to divine cognition. 
The situation is dramatically different when it comes to the understanding of the natural order, i.e., 
knowledge of physical things. Here, once again, both God and humans possess science, but ours is 
essentially different from His. We drag an inherent stain in our scientific endeavors regarding the 
natural realmnamely, our lack of ability to “create” (available to God alone) and our subsequent 
need for abstraction. After all, “[s]ince human knowledge is purely abstractive, the more our sciences 
are immersed in bodily matter, the less certain they are” ([15], p. 52). So Vico confided the aspect we 
ought to emphasize while doing science in order to overcome this genetic limitation: “Just as divine 
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truth is what God sets in order and creates in the act of knowing it, so human truth is what man puts 
together and makes in the act of knowing it” ([15], p. 46). Constructability“putting together”should 
be the first criterion of truth, and thus, of scientific success. 
In this vein, Vico reminded us that “God knows all things because in Himself He contains the 
elements with which He puts all things together. Man, on the other hand, strives to know these things 
by a process of division” ([15], p. 48). This “process of division”, quite literally fashions the essence of 
human science, which itself amounts to the “anatomy of nature’s works” ([15], p. 48). This “anatomy” 
goes beyond a mere figure of speech: we need to dissect, qua physician, the elements of nature, and 
then cognitivelynot existentially, which is only divinely feasible—recreate the object according to 
our inquiry. Thus, when Vico refers to “dissection”, he is referring to experimentation! ([17], p. 103). 
Vico’s indebtedness to Bacon is more explicit when he makes allusion to an incipient Modern 
scientific method. He asserted that “hypothesis about the natural order are considered most 
illuminating and are accepted with the fullest consent of everyone, if we can base experiments on 
them, in which we make something similar to nature” ([15], p. 52). Considering the ingeniousness of 
Bacon’s proposal pointed abovenamely, by pressing nature to answer our own questionswe 
actually are anchoring ourselves in reality, not removing our minds from it. This critical reverence 
towards reality begets wisdom, which ultimately “in its broad sense is nothing but the science of 
making such use of things as their nature dictates” ([18], CXIV: 326). According to Vico, Bacon did 
nothing less than bridging our intellectual capacity with the natural world. However, it is Vico himself 
who carries the Baconian lesson to its fulfillment: the experimental reconstruction of a phenomenon 
under controlled conditions is just a first step towards the recreation of the object. True knowledge is 
acquired when the model becomes the modeled. 
2. Undisclosed Ontological Commitments of Contemporary Scientific Modeling 
2.1. Nanotechnology: Feasibility of the Viconian Re-Building of Reality 
Duns Scotus proposed a “univocity of being” where our difference from the Divine would be one of 
quantity, not of quality. This view later morphed via Vico into the notion that true knowledge would 
imply the necessity of building. Kant himself asserted that God’s intuitive knowledgeHis equivalent 
of the kind of knowledge generated by our “pure intuitions of sensibility”would necessarily imply 
creation. Moreover, Bacon gave back to us the confidence in the possibility of knowledge (lost after 
Original Sin) by means of experimentation and the “mechanical arts”mechanistic modeling that 
arguably fostered the Scientific Revolution. 
It is Vico who most clearly stated, regarding the essential reliance of knowledge upon the best 
possibly constructed model, that “Verum et factum convertuntur”: The Truth and the Made 
convergeor in more colloquial language, “if you know it, build it”. Of course, only a Creator could 
fully know its own creation. However, since the Scotian ethos defends that humans can epistemically 
share His Light in an infinitely lower but real degree, we can in principle also know under such light. 
This emphasis on constructability as criterion of truth (and also as part and parcel of a critique against 
a Cartesian epistemology), has inspired later thinkers more concerned with the tractability of 
physically embedded problems. 
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Vico’s prescient Verum Factum seems to neatly link the Univocatio Entis and Imago Dei views into 
a zenith of knowledge attainment that drives an important aspect of contemporary scientific research. 
Vico’s claim on the future “certain sciences” is telling: “The most certain sciences are those  
that wash away the blemish of their origin and that become similar to divine science through their 
creative activity in as much as in these sciences that which is true and that which is made are 
convertible” ([15], p. 52). It should thus not come as a surprise that one can find in contemporary times 
a cutting edge research laboratory named “The Giambattista Institute of Cybernetics and Applied 
Epistemology” in the Netherlands. In fact, the whole rise and demise of cybernetics12  could be 
understood from the viewpoint of having suffered such fate due to the cybernetic legendary emphasis 
on “embodiment” as the core its scientific methodologyitself deeply rooted in the drive behind 
“Modern”13 scientific practice. The tension between, on the one hand a theoretical structure per se, and 
on the other, the physical anchoring of such theory, gets all the more interesting once one notices how 
contemporary science still understands its explanatory task in fairly Modern termsin other words, 
roughly mechanistically.14 These values are indeed essential to the core of the Western tradition, as 
expressed in the longing for a divine knowledge that entails the possibility of radically transforming 
(modifying, fixing and improving) a creation given to us for our disposalourselves included. Such 
impetus for control and re-construction is ever more present with us, and in tangible ways. 
In 1945, the Manhattan Project physicist Richard Feynman, better known later for his Nobel price 
research on quantum mechanics, refused a teaching invitation from Princeton Universitydespite 
having earned his doctorate from there in 1942. Instead, Feynman accepted a teaching position at 
CalTech, where he delivered a talk that would come down in history as the first addressing of the 
possibility of manipulating reality at a level where the transformation and recreation of objects becomes 
scientifically feasible. The one-time lecture, entitled “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom” [22] 
remained, however, largely unknown, until Eric Drexler, a doctor in engineering from M.I.T., found it 
and subsequently published it almost three decades later, as part of his book Engines of Creation: The 
Coming Era of Nanotechnology [23]. Although the term “nanotechnology” was previously coined a 
decade earlier by Norio Taniguchi (Tokio University of Science), it is after Drexler’s book that the 
notion started to gain traction in the engineering andlaterin the science community. The journal 
Nature has now a permanent section dedicated to nanoscale15 research. 
Canonically, nanotechnology aims at the mechanical manipulation of matter at the molecular 
levelliterally, atom by atom. Such level of reality is allegedly of utmost importance, since stuff can 
be still “classically” understood under a Newtonian light and rearranged without incurring in quantum 
                                                 
12  Cybernetics was an Anglo-American scientific movement alive in the 1940’s and that lasted a decade. I am currently 
writing a dissertation on the possible reasons for its collapse. Cybernetics might have been the strong proxy between the 
humanistic advances laid out in the previous 3 Sections, and the later proposals in techno-scientific outlooks displayed 
below. Lack of space precludes me from further articulating this missing link. For a short introduction on cybernetics,  
see [19]. For a longer exposition on this scientific movement see [20]. 
13  As opposed to “contemporary”. 
14  Although this is bound to continue changing. See [21]. 
15  One billionth of a meter. 
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indeterminacy.16 Since a physical thing owes its nature to its particular atomic arrangement (one 
modifies this arrangement and ends up with another thing), the possibilities immediately foreseen are 
arguably flabbergasting. In principle, an eventual “molecular assembler” could transform any physical 
entity into another physical entity, by means of reordering its atomic structure. Such an envisioned feat 
would obviously transform the world as we know it in radical ways, replacing its economy, resetting 
global health, and trivializing some deep problemssuch as the possibility of attaining intelligence 
and life artificially (now amenable of being duplicated and enhanced, instead of “found” or “created”). 
Even if by consensus the field still is in its infancy, the first decade of our century has witnessed 
some relatively important achievements, which keeps fostering interest in the field in a gradual but 
relentless way. Feynman’s explicit proposal, even if only theoretical, tried to garner attention towards 
that “untreated” level of reality in the midst of the Cold War. He predicted that research performed at a 
nanoscale17 would have as beneficiaries, among other fields, microscopy and computation. Indeed only 
6 years later, in 1965, George Moore would be proclaiming what would be henceforth known as 
“Moore’s Law”: Every 18–24 months the amount of transistors that could fit in an integrated circuit 
would double. Thereafter, somewhat expectably, two cornerstones in nanotechnology occurred in a 
common area shared between computation and microscopy. In 1981 two IBM scientists constructed 
the first “scanning tunneling microscope”, which allowed humans, for the first time, to actually see 
atoms separately. Eight years later, in 1989, another two IBM scientists rearranged 35 individual atoms 
at will, forming the logo “IBM”. This last achievement properly showed that what nanotechnology was 
aiming forthe mechanical manipulation of individual atomsseemed to be in fact feasible [24]. 
By the turn of the millennium, the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative was founded, receiving 
its first funding during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Quickly realizing nanoscience’s 
potential for multilayered pervasive and disruptive consequences, in 2004 the European Union 
produced a document entitled Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology [25]. There the 
European community made clear its preferred emphasis on the possible benefits for society as a 
wholerather than on the human individual, as the American initiative would suggest. The same year, 
the United Kingdom’s Royal Society released the report Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: 
Opportunities and Uncertainties [26]. In this report Great Britain called for focusing on investigating 
the possible toxic side effects of doing research at the nanoscale. By 2005, further manipulation of 
individual atoms was accomplished, this time by means of constructing a nanoscale “car”. A team lead 
by Professor James Tour (Rice University) put together four fullerenes 18  united by a “frame” 
composed of hydrogen molecules. The experiment was designed to find out in which way fullerenes 
move across materials. When the surface (the “road”) got warmed up (e.g., to 200 degrees Celsius), the 
                                                 
16  Quantum effects, however, are part and parcel of the whole nanoscale somewhat “exotic” halo. Existing within the 
threshold of 1–100nm, the effects pertaining to the so called “quantum realm” are present, and thus, materials tend to 
behave in a way that is absent at the macro-level (e.g., and otherwise inert material becomes conductive, etc.). For an 
addressing of the quantum-related problems in nanoscale research, see Drexler’s “An Open Letter to Richard Smalley” 
in ([23], Appendix). 
17  The prefix “nano-” for these matters was not yet coined at the time, so he did not use it. 
18  A fullereneor “buckyball”is a spherical carbon molecule. 
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diminutive cars began to run over the road at relatively “high speed”.19 The idea of a nano-machine, 
indeed proposed by Feynman as a future possibility, seemed to be closer to reality. 
One needs to stop for a minute and consider the import of these advances. Indeed, they pertain to 
the very heart of scientific practice tout court. Vico’s aim for an absolute recreation of the studied 
object (the model) as the onlyor at least, the best—signature of true knowledge has certainly been at 
the heart of the scientific mind since the beginning of Modern Science. Indeed the case could be made 
that such aim is the essence of what is expected out of Bacon’s experimentum crucis. Unfortunately, 
due to the very nature of realityleave alone the nature of human cognitionall we could aimed for 
was the best possible description of a behavior manifested by a certain phenomenon or object. 
Furthermore, when the mapping of a complex system’s behavior triggers an explosion of variables, the 
set up model seems to be facing imminent demise. There comes a point where the range of possible 
behaviors is just too immense to be captured and articulated. It would seem that at that moment, doing 
a piece by piece mapping of the structure of the complex object itself becomes more feasible. 
However, again, in light of the nature of reality and human cognition, this has shown to be a practically 
unattainable feat, due to the staggering complexity of its structurewhich made scientists focus on 
behavior in the first place (e.g., behaviorism’s reduction of the human person to a black box).20 
Ultimately, the endeavor for mapping and rebuilding the actual structure of an entitya.k.a., attaining 
truthwas right from the start inherently beyond our reach. 
But now, the epistemic hope of knowing the object in an almost divine way21 seems to be amenable 
of physical realization. The Viconian horizon of literally re-creating our object of study as proof of true 
knowledge could finally be within reach. Taking us closer to attaining ultimate knowledge and control, 
the constructed model could become so close to the modeled object that any distinction would be 
rendered trivial. Vico’s dictum of “if you know it, build it”, seems to be close to actual instantiation at 
a qualitatively distinct level. After all, the famousif unfulfilled—cybernetic dogma was that “the 
best material model for a cat is another, or preferably the same cat” ([30], p. 320). Reordering atoms 
one by one, indeed restructuring the very fabric of reality, would have sounded to Vico as the logical 
step towards the final understanding and mastery of nature. 
Furthermore, the possibility of building nanomachines arguably surpasses Vico’s “verum factum” 
stance, connecting it with the profoundly ambitious Baconian project—project that was recognized and 
praised by Vico himself. Not only could objects be partitioned atom by atom, but these parts can be so 
well rearranged that a working machine could arise. After all, that is what we see that living organisms 
are conformed of: Countless nanomachines working in perfect synchronicity, making up what is 
regarded as a living system. In fact, the summatory of such realities constitutes the totality of biology. 
At this point, the distinction between the natural and the artificial has already collapsed. The reckoning 
of the building blocks of reality subsequently allows for the manipulation and arrangement of them all 
                                                 
19  However, the “nanocar” lacked an engine, and thus, it was not a car in the full sense of the word (a.k.a., a machine with 
four wheels, self-propelled by a motor) [27]. 
20  This dichotomy was an important source of tension for cybernetics. It might have in fact collaborated towards 
cybernetics’ ultimate demise. See [28] and [29]. 
21  After all the thrust behind the Scientific Revolution, as indicated in the section pertaining to Francis Bacon). 
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the way to a living mechanical process. In nanoscience, both the organic and inorganic are equally 
dissected, treated and put together at will. 
Currently operating scientific epistemologies stemming from this development might profoundly 
affect our overall outlook regarding life, as the following section will show. 
2.2. Synthetic Biology: Accomplishment of the Baconian Machinization22 of Nature 
Scientists of the above mentioned Nanotechnology Initiative have been noticing that most 
biological processes indeed happen at the nano level of reality. As examples, the width of the strand of 
the DNA helix is around 2 nm; the average size of a virus is 40 nm; a small bacteria’s size is 200 nm; and 
so on. The legacy inherited from the Scientific Revolution gradually deemed “natural” occurrences as 
mechanical in natureto the chagrin of those who saw a machine and a living system as being 
fundamentally at odds.23 For instance, cybernetics took the mechanistic understanding of life to its 
ultimate workable and theoretical extreme. As such, it gave examples in nature that speak of clever 
mechanisms that must be underpinned by neatly working machinery. In cybernetic parlance, if nature 
was capable of accomplishing such a feat, we should logically be able to do it as well, since a machine 
by definition deems its type of materiality (or even lack thereof) as irrelevant, relying strictly on its 
determinate behavior.24 One classically mechanistic case in biology occurring at the sub-cellular level 
is that of the ribosome, which strikingly resembles a factory assembly lineand which gains with this 
the strange “honor” of being referred to as a “molecular assembler” ([23], Chapter 1). 
Biologists have in later years expressed interest in another instance in nature that offers an even 
more striking example of machinery functioning at a nano-level. The bacterial flagellum has been of 
interest to biologists, philosophers and even theologians for several reciprocally intertwined reasons, 
which could all be put under one conceptual umbrella. If rigorously situated in a historical context, the 
attraction exerted in the scientific community by this organism’s feature is indeed expectable. What is 
curious is that, beyond scientists, some of the people behind this interest come from unlikely flanks. 
Thanks to the progress in crystallography and nano-photography, we are now able to see as part of the 
organism what could only be referred to as an “off-board” motor. The flagellum itself, a tube 20 nm 
wide, is attached to a complex array of amino acids that make up a structure that not only resembles an 
engine, but also seems to be an engine. One can identify pistons, camshaft, levers and an axle. The 
rotation produced (which allows the flagellum to act as a propeller) is analogous to the motion found in 
                                                 
22  I use “machinization” instead of “mechanization” in order to put emphasis on the ontology of the object qua machine, 
instead of its process or behavior—without saying that they are unrelated. 
23  The attempt of denial of a machine-organism isomorphism within the last century was largely nested upon the alleged 
fact that a living organism can self-organize (to achieve biological homeostasis with its environment and survive) 
whereas a machine cannot. In face of this, the cyberneticist William Ross Ashby embarked upon the project of 
elaborating a more sophisticated and complete notion of a machine. This enriched notion can indeed show powers of 
self-organization. Thus the bridge between the living and the non-living (which behaves as living) was stablished: 
Machines could be alive. In fact, they always werein nature—but we did not notice it until recently. For Ashby’s 
treatment of self-organization in machines, see [31] and [32]. 
24  For cybernetics’ addressing of the question regarding the nature of a machine in general, see [33]. For incipient attempts 
at understanding the nature of a machine (mainly stemming from efforts to articulate the nature of an algorithm)  
see [34] and [35]. 
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an engine, pistons moving an axle via the camshaft, which in turn makes an exterior propeller quickly 
turn. Endowed with this acquired motility, the bacteria can freely navigate through a liquid 
environment. The system seems to so neatly have found a way to achieve locomotion in a thoroughly 
mechanical way, that Keiichi Namba, from the Graduate School of Frontier Biosciences at Osaka 
University (and a world’s leading authority in bacterial flagellum studies), asserts that 
The structural designs and functional mechanisms to be revealed in the complex machinery 
of the bacterial flagellum could provide many novel technologies that would become a 
basis for future nanotechnology, from which we should be able to find many useful 
applications [36]. 
Once we have identified a naturally assembled motor, we have found the proof that nano-motors are 
in fact possible. Nature seems now further disenchanted from any surrounding aura of mystery, 
thoroughly mechanized all the way down. For starters, once we recognize self-motion in an entity, we 
can enrich a view that understandably prefers to focus on structure of the object (as seen above), 
considering now the object’s behavior in a rather complementary manner. This behavior will no longer 
be modeled having “blacked out” the structure that is producing it. Instead, it will have a clear 
correspondence relation with the underlying structure. Indeed, we are facing something deeper than 
just a biomimetic venue for future nanoscale research. 
There are several issues to consider starting with the adjudication itself of the notion of “machine” 
to the mechanism connected to the flagellum. At earlier times, when pictures of the structure were 
substantially blurred, there was debate regarding the possibility of committing an anthropomorphisation 
of whatever we were seeing. After William Paley, we are uneasily aware of the consequences of 
finding and proclaiming real machinery in nature [37]. However, when the images got strikingly clear, 
mastering the complete atomic structure of the area responsible for the bacterial motility, little doubt 
remained regarding whether or not we were witnessing an actual natural motor. We indeed are.25 And 
that created another set of considerations. 
It would seem that an evolutionary account of how the amino acid “pieces” of this engine are  
put together would not be satisfactory. Moreover, this evolutionary blind-spot allegedly happens at 
two-levels. At first glance, it would seem that, since we are talking about after all a machine, we 
should be willing to accept some entailments. One of them is the claimed fact that a machine is 
constituted by “parts”, and these parts cannot submit to an explanation dependent on evolution and 
genetic mutation as a whole. These pieces should have always existed as such, without evolutionary 
change. If the latter would be the case (if a piece would “change”) then it would not fit into the motor 
and would render it useless –similarly to what occurs when a gear changes its shape and ruins an 
engine. This observation would seem to trump the way in which evolution works. 
What is behind this line of discourse is the falsificationist goal of finding an evolutionary niche 
which could not be explained away by “natural selection”thus defeating Charles Darwin in his own 
turf, given that he famously conceded that “[i]f it could be demonstrated that any complex organ 
                                                 
25  Professor Namba does not hesitate in identifying in such a mechanism an actual engine: “The bacterial flagellum is a 
rotary nanomachine that spins at hundreds of revolutions per second driven by the electrochemical potential difference 
across the cytoplasmic membrane” ([38], p. 417). 
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existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my 
theory would absolutely break down” ([39], p. 146). 
An answer to this raised observation has certainly emerged. There are instances where bacteria 
show the lack of some amino acids (“pieces”) in the equivalent area that interfaces more directly with 
its environment. The bacteria that caused the bubonic plague, for instance, have their flagella attached 
to the body but not through a rotor. Instead it is stiff and fixed, serving as a needlethrough which the 
bacteria transmit the contagious agent. This occurrence should point to a horizon where evolution can 
still play the ultimate explanatory role. In this case it would be doing it by somehow getting rid 
(supposedly via genetic mutation) of certain pieces of the “engine”, in order to provide another role in 
the survival of the entity. However, such counterargument also has a rebuttal. It would seem that the 
bacterial motility system of a rotary flagellum is older than its fixed counterpart, hence rendering the 
latter as an unlikely ancestor. To which it is still answered that the flagellum’s ancestor might have 
been completely extinguished, without trace. The discussion goes on. 
Some “Intelligent Design” theorists exploit this issue as a workhorse against what they refer to as a 
scientific tyranny of sorts exercised by Neo-Darwinism26 in American academia. Intelligent Design 
(ID), according to its proponents, is a valid scientific alternative to the Neo-Darwinian widely adopted 
standpoint. ID claims the allegedly verifiable fact that “design” (that which could only have been 
accomplished by an intelligent agency) is present in nature by default. It was always the case, the 
defenders would say, but now we get to see it clearer thanks to technological progress that furthered 
sciencesuch as crystallographyand not just via philosophical reasoning.27 They would stop short 
of saying what kind of intelligence they are referring to, but since most of them seem to be practicing 
Protestant science professors, 28  those who dispute this view –usually atheist philosophers 29  and 
Catholic scientists30accuse them of attempting to smuggle religious “creationism” into the realm of 
scientific discourse. 31 At this point (when the religious convictions of those engaged in the debate are 
                                                 
26  Or the New Synthesis: Darwinian evolution later improved with Gregor Mendel’s theory of genetic mutation. 
27  E.g., As in St. Thomas Aquinas’ fifth way within the Quinque Viae ([40], Part I, Question 2, Article 3). 
28  E.g., William Dembski and Jonathan Welsh. 
29  E.g., Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins. 
30  E.g., Kenneth Miller and George Coyne, S.J. 
31  The Catholic Church’s Magisterium has repeatedly referred to neo-Darwinism as more than “just a hypothesis”. In 1996 
John Paul II said while addressing the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: 
Taking into account the state of scientific research at the time as well as of the requirements of theology, the 
Encyclical Humani Generis considered the doctrine of “evolutionism” a serious hypothesis, worthy of investigation 
and in-depth study equal to that of the opposing hypothesis…Today, almost half a century after the publication of 
the Encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of more than one hypothesis in the theory of evolution. It 
is indeed remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by researchers, following a series of 
discoveries in various fields of knowledge. The convergence, neither sought nor fabricated, of the results of work 
that was conducted independently is in itself a significant argument in favour of this theory ([41], para. 4). 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Benedict XVI), then Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, ratified in 2004 a document drafted by the International Theological Commission that read: 
Since it has been demonstrated that all living organisms on earth are genetically related, it is virtually certain that all 
living organisms have descended from this first organism. Converging evidence from many studies in the physical 
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brought to the fore), a sort of justified ad hominem fallacy is invoked, and the whole environment of 
discourse morphs into what is known as the not so surreptitiously ongoing “Culture Wars”. 32 It is in 
this context that ID advocates denounce the said “tyranny” of neo-Darwinism, which allegedly 
monopolizes academic environments in meta-scientific (even political) ways, securing a pre-epistemic 
(anti-religious) and epistemic (atheist) attitude in culture and society. 
To be sure, it is not the first time in history that a religious motivation attempts to defeat a certain 
scientific view due to the supposed negative consequences that the latter would entail. Jesuit 
mathematicians (e.g., Giovanni Saccheri) were drawn towards the possibility of finding a geometry 
that would not be Euclidean, in order to dismantle both the Critique of Pure Reason’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic and the Prolegomena, so that Immanuel Kant’s challenge to metaphysics would get eroded. 
In similar fashion, ID supporters tend to be particularly prone to find instances of machinery in nature, 
in order to advance their claims regarding the presence of “design” in the natural world. Allegedly, as 
indicated above, a machine by definition is constituted in such way (not only in its being deterministic, 
but also in its being inherently constituted by an array of parts) that it defies “natural selection”, thus 
obtaining for us a sort of reverse-Turing test for nature. If a natural entity cannot be accounted for by 
evolutionas it is the case with a machinethen it has to be designed. 
The debate continues, and it may not show signs of receding any time soon. Without attempting to 
reduce, minimize or dismiss it, one could argue that deep divergences regarding the different 
conceptualizations of notions such as “creation”, “design”, and most importantly, “machine” rest at the 
core of the conflict. Be as it may, one feature particularly relevant for this section stands out. Of all the 
people involved in this debate,33 nobody seems to have a problem with one premise which, in the past, 
would have likely stopped the dialogue in its tracks. Everyone seems to take for granted that what we 
have before our eyes is, beyond any reasonable doubt, a machine. From a cybernetic lecture of reality, 
there is considerable import in this assertionor realization. Facing the bacterial flagellum, whatever 
vitalist or exceptionalist remnants of a metaphysic tradition that were seemingly still at work in the 
most materialists thinkers at the time of cybernetics (mid-twentieth century), seem to be extinct 
towards the second decade of the twenty-first century. The metaphysical safety-bumpers seem to have 
worn off. Probably just a few of us today would go through any pain in acknowledging that what we 
are witnessing is both a product of nature and a machine. A fully natural and fully machinal entity.34 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and biological sciences furnishes mounting support for some theory of evolution to account for the development and 
diversification of life on earth ([42], para. 63). 
Regarding the last Pope, Francis (and the Catholic Tradition’s position) the Editorial of the journal Nature had this 
to say on the matter: 
…what is clear is that, contrary to widespread belief, the modern Catholic Church is science-friendly and Pope 
Francis will no doubt continue, and perhaps deepen, that tradition. The Church’s strong support for Darwinian 
evolution, for example, contrasts sharply with the backwards unscientific belief in creationism of many US 
evangelicals and lawmakers—a concept that Pope Benedict XVI rightly criticized in 2007 as “absurd” [43]. 
32  For an extensive coverage of the issue, see [44] and [45]. 
33  Against ID: Kenneth Miller, Robert Pennock, Michael Ruse. For ID: Michael Behe, William Dembski, Steve Fuller and 
Jerry Fodor (the last one more anti-Darwin than pro-ID, although he has written in ID blogs). 
34  Ray Kurzweil, National Medal of Technology and Innovation laureate and Google’s current director of engineering, 
advocates for a preparation towards an inescapable future where humans and machines will be completely merged, 
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This is probably the most typically cybernetic feature of all the ones we havesomewhat 
unwittinglyinherited from cybernetics proper.35 
The Baconian mechanical arts that were to rescue mankind from the damning epistemic darkness 
set in by Original Sinand which mechanized the physical universe after the subsequently triggered 
Scientific Revolutionseem to have indeed provided successful explanatory mechanisms. To the extent 
in which biology is being physicalized, it was just a matter of time until the separating line between the 
artificial and the natural became blurredvia the articulate consideration of what a machine 
essentially is. As long as we have a scientific method in place with verifiable outcomes (experimentum 
crucis) towards augmentation of knowledgeand we do—Bacon would have likely approved. 
However, the Culture Wars ironically give us still another opportunity to witness novel approaches 
in scientific modelingbesides the Baconian radical mechanization towards intentional modification. 
The all-important issue of simulation in science will be shown as logically emerging from the 
sometimes practically impossible frameworks that scientific experimentation requires. Its validity as a 
modeling methodology occurred within an important turn of events within the ongoing Culture Wars. 
This is the topic of the last section. 
2.3. Simulation as Reality: Setting a Scotian Continnum between Immateriality and Physicality 
During the fall of 2004, the public school of the town of Dover, Pennsylvania, introduced a new 
biology textbook [50] where Neo-Darwinian evolution was presented alongside an “Intelligent 
Design” alternative account. Following a mandate from the school committee, a statement had to be 
read out loud by the biology teacher, referring clearly to the existence of both accounts, so that the 
student could evaluate and decide on its own. By next fall, a number of concerned teachers and parents 
had presented a law-suit against the school. The plaintiff sustained that such “strategy” was in fact 
introducing religion in science class at a public high school. What occurred next signaled the last 
chapter in the conflict that emerged several times out of the idiosyncratically American “separation of 
church and state”. 
Expert witnesses were called to testify. Several of those mentioned above were called up to testify 
on the subject.36 It soon became clear that what was at stake was the American legal take on the very 
identity of science. The religious motivations behind the Scientific Revolutionevent that could be 
understood, as per Francis Bacon, as a tension within Christianity in order to overcome a “genetic” 
ignorance set off by Original Sin37were brought to the fore. The methodology of science, the  
so-called “scientific method” took precedence. ID supporters claimed that Intelligent Design had a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
rendering any meaningful distinction impossibleeven discriminatory. Fuller calls this stance the “cybernetic” view of 
the future of humanity, seeing an understanding of anthropology as artificial theology. (See ([46], Chapter 1) and ([47], 
Chapter 1)). However, a truly cybernetic view would refer to man in a present stage, and in an obvious way, as just 
another instance of a typical machine. 
35  Fully fleshing out the lineage between cybernetics and current scientific disciplines would entail a pain-staking 
articulation that remains to be done. The closer attempt is probably Margaret Boden’s two volume work [48].  
Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s book [20] attempts to unveil some of the cybernetic ancestral features of contemporary disciplines, 
but according to Gualtiero Picinini, he falls short of completing the task [49]. 
36  Previous note on the principal figures in the Culture Wars debate. 
37  Section 2. 
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valid space in the scientific discourse based upon this very method. They denied the interference of 
any preconceived theological element, relying instead in methodological deduction after a hypothesis 
and subsequent induction following the evidence. In this context, instances such as the bacterial 
flagellum above mentioned were presented in detail, allegedly demonstrating in purely scientific 
fashion that there is evidence in nature for the existence of “irreducibly complex” machinesdynamical 
arrays whose perfectly fitting internal parts cannot be accounted for by evolution. As seen in the 
preceding section, these parts needed to have been “intelligently designed” to fit each other and 
function in tandem. 
There was critical reaction against ID, signaling the alleged undisclosed feature indicated above—a 
secularly masked creationism. However, soon it became apparent that “evolution” had to be treated 
under the same judging scope. The taken for granted scandalously undeniable evidence for the truth of 
evolution had to be shown. How do we know, with the sharp certainty that only science could provide, 
that evolution is true? After all, ID was being attacked from those very grounds. Accordingly, U.S. 
District Judge John E. Jones, a Republican Christian, asked for the same sort of evidence that evolution 
advocates were claiming ID cannot produce. 
Since ID theorists almost make a living out of reciting by heart the claimed Darwinian flaws, 
evolution’s blind spots were so severely criticized that its advocates at some point indeed struggled. 
Robert Pennock, a philosopher of science and expert witness in the trial for the side of evolution, came 
up with an alleged proof that neo-Darwinian evolution is not just “a theory”, namely, perfectly 
falsifiable and hence amenable of being discarded and superseded.38 
Avida 39  is a computer program that generates an “evolutionary” environment in silico. More 
specifically, the program is designed to create and maintain entities that compete for resources. Each 
has its own memory allocation and virtual central processing unit (CPU), and they are protected from 
each other. They have to evolve in such way that they can gain access to time with the main CPU. 
These digital entities have the capacity to modify (re-program) themselves, in order to reach a better fit 
for survivalnot completely unlike sophisticated computer viruses that fight for their “lives” in 
domestic computing environments. In Pennock’s words, “it is clear that natural selection can be 
perfectly instantiated in A-life systems” ([52], p. 37). In case there is any doubt still lingering so as to 
how to understand these words, he asserted that “this is not a simulation” of evolution. Rather, it is an 
“instance” of it. The programor what it purported to show—did convince the judge.40 Thus the court 
declared evolution as a fact. Materiality was not deemed necessary to accept the truism of evolution. 
Pennock further affirmed that: 
                                                 
38  The perceived exchangeability between the notions of “hypothesis” and “theory” seems to occur mainly in the English 
language. The statement of evolution as being “just a hypothesis” would in any case make more sense. Evolution as 
“just a theory” can be translated to evolution as “just a tested hypothesis”—the canonical definition of theorywhich 
would be of course problematic. 
39  For an explanation co-written by Pennock of the role of Avida in scientific methodology, see [51]. 
40  To be sure, the ID side (the defendants) lost the case not only due to this finding. An early draft of the controversial 
textbook was found, and in it, it was shown that the word “creationism” was scratched and replaced with “intelligent 
design” on top. This was enough evidence to show, for the judge, that religion was being smuggled into science class in 
a public school, thereby violating the constitutional separation between church and state in that country. 
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While it is true that evolution of carbon-based organisms is the prototype of the concept, 
this historical fact is not a sufficient reason to limit its scope. Why be carbon-centric? It is 
the patterns of causal interactions that are relevant, not the particular material substrate. 
…the material substrate of the Darwinian processes should be irrelevant to whether we 
recognize something as an instance of Darwin’s evolutionary mechanism ([52], p. 32). 
Thus even if the witnessed “evolution” happened entirely inside a machine, one nevertheless can 
claim now to have “proof”at least in the eyes of the judgethat evolution is, plainly and simply, 
true. Facing an instance of the awkward relation between scientific practice and institutionality, one 
could object that a legal decision cannot make, let alone rule, science. This objection could recognize 
in this court ruling, at most, a geo-culturally limited change of attitude regarding what is real and what 
it is not in its own legal environment. Now virtual realities count as legal facts. However, once we 
factor in Pennock’s statements, we can readily notice that this epistemological ethos has a theoretical 
and empirical background that goes way beyond contemporary legalismsin fact, it is increasingly 
shared by salient scientific enterprises. Indeed Pennock is by no means isolated in advancing these 
views –and the judge probably knew that much. Some recent examples are relevant. 
In 2006, a group of scientists lead by Klaus Schulten (University of Illinois at Urbana) simulated an 
entire virus, modeling it atom by atom. Unsurprisingly, the study was published in the journal 
Structure. The satellite tobacco mosaic virus, one of the smallest in nature, had its approximately one 
million atoms “recreated” simultaneously. It required the sheer computing capability of one of the 
most powerful machines on the planet, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications. Still, it 
took 100 days to bring up to “life” only 50 nanoseconds of the “virtual” virus [53]. Later on in 2012, 
Markus Covert (Stanford University) and his team recreated a complete organisma bacterium.41 This 
unicellular entity, the Mycoplasma genitalia, is the living being with the smallest genetic footprint: 525 
genes. Remarkably, this time the entity, recreated in silico, underwent a reproductive process. Serving 
as a witness to the kind of progress that computation can develop in just 6 years, this time the virtual 
entity lasted 10 hours: The actual time the modeled entity takes to reproduce, and remarkably, the time 
the constructed model took to do it as well. The constructed model and the modeled organism were 
operationally identical, all the way down to their atomic existence. For attaining this, a cluster of 128 
powerful computers interconnected were required. It was the first time a complete organism has been 
entirely reproduced inside a virtual environment [54]. 
In all fairness to cybernetics, these scientific accomplishments were the stuff that made up the 
cybernetitians’ dreamsalbeit unaccomplishable at their time, due to the lack of technological 
advancement in what regards manipulation of materials.42 However, cybernetics’ penchant for actual 
(physical) model building,43 at least theoretically, was not entirely newas we have seen in Section 3. 
Although it became right from the start a sort of defining feature for the cybernetic enterprise, the 
                                                 
41  It is traditionally understood that a virus does not qualify as a “complete” organism, given that it needs a host to survive. 
In fact, debates regarding its status as a “living” entity pivot upon this very issue. 
42  In fact this very issue, shifting from behavior to structure in scientific modeling, caused deep internal tensions within 
cybernetics, as indicated above [28,29]. 
43  Famouseven “media-friendly”—cybernetic autonomous machines were Claude Shannon’s “rats”, Grey Walter 
“tortoises” and Ross Ashby’s “homeostat” [55]. 
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recreation of a studied object has deep roots in the Western tradition of philosophy, arguably reaching 
a peak with Vico’s dictum for interchangeability between object and model as an insurmountable 
footprint of truth. However, the tension between the mandate for material model construction and the 
seemingly perennial temptation for abandoning all grips with physical reality since Plato, might have 
proven to be deeper and more pervadingand might had spelled, at the time,44 the demise of the 
cybernetic project. 
It is ironic that a model existent solely in virtual reality would come to undermine the survival of 
Intelligent Design, since “ID clearly descends from the Franciscan side in accepting a univocal account 
of language” ([1], p. 107). Indeed it was the Franciscan Duns Scotus who established a type of strong 
relation between physical entities and disembodied realms. This connection found echo in Newton’s 
idea of having access to God’s mind. Reacting against Original Sin’s epistemic darkness via Bacon’s 
mechanical arts, we can recover that Adamian divinely infused knowledge, instantiated in the only 
possible way that can show its divine origin: the radical (re)creation of objectsas Vico foresaw. This 
closes the Scotian circle, where the attributes of humans and those of God are different in degree, not 
in kind. This dynamic might entail a new context of thinking about the status of what we understand as 
a human entity. Specifically, a synthetic biology spearheaded by a profoundly mechanistic view of 
lifewhere the distinction between the natural and the artificial is blurredmight have found a 
renewed strength thanks to the promises of a fundamental restructuring of nature via nano-science. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Whatever outcome may arrive regarding the status of “the human” from this deep restructuring of 
the technological impetus, it would be useful to realize that the allegedly ideas driving these late 
scientific foresights and technological goals are not radically newat least in spirit. Francis Bacon 
launched a mechanization of realitysuccessfully implemented by Isaac Newtonwhich shaped the 
way in which natural phenomena are scientifically dissected and systematized via an inter-operatively 
successful corpus of “explanatory mechanisms”. For Giambattista Vico the ultimate signature for true 
knowledge becomes the capacity to literally build the object of knowledge, and so the total 
mechanization of explainable phenomena had to eventuallybut necessarilyoccur. Nature becomes 
understandable due to its mechanical essence. Moreover, machine, by definition, can be tinkered with, 
fixed and improved: Man can indeed be closer to its own potential. After all, as Scotian philosophy 
would suggest with reasonable stretch, divine qualities were always present in us to some degree. The 
angelic features dormant in us might graduallybut finallycome to fruition. Indeed the intellectual 
tendency for disengagement from physical substrata towards an immaterial, “cleaner” and universal 
reality has been with us since Ancient Greece. It would seem that the force transcending embodiment 
towards non-materiality is finally allowing for a purification of the best possible mold. Once that 
abstracted containment is filled up, it can be re-instantiated in physical realitythus radically 
modifying it. 
To repeat, this hub of technological outlooks might have important implications for the Western 
notion of what it means to be a human being. It is no wonder that mega-projects such as the so-called 
                                                 
44  Late 1950s. 
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Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno (NBIC) Convergence,45 exploiting the possibilities opened up by methodologies 
of bio-mechanization, virtual simulation and nano-construction, have high hopes for an upcoming 
Renaissance 2.0 of sorts.46 A scientifically viable instantiation of a collective hope for a positively 
transhumanist [58] future seems to be in the making, regardless of whether the approach for its 
implementation takes a high-risk stance47 or one that advocates precaution.48. This dynamism of 
mechanization, purified abstraction and ulterior re-instantiation might indeed hold the key for our 
biological survival vis a vis a potentially radical ecological changeeven if in the process the very 
notion of “human” gets trivialized all the way into oblivion. 
The awareness that “human nature”whatever we understand by it—would indeed not survive the 
advance of science is a common sentiment among scholars in the last decades. As if we would have to 
give up on our philosophy in order to preserve our biology. If we remind them that the very forces 
behind these pervasive technological disruptions are deeply rooted into what prominent humanists 
proposed between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the context for understanding this progress 
can be geared towards a more enriched and embedded approacheven if what we obtain as an 
outcome is beyond recognition. Having in consideration the metaphysical tenets behind these 
disruptive technologies could further foster their advancement, correspondingly cultivating the 
awareness that there is a hopeful, transcendent, notion of what it entails to be humanwhich inspired 
these Medieval and early Modern intellectual forces in the first place. The difference is that now we 
                                                 
45  This was a coordinated effort launched in 2000 to synchronize current developments in sciences and technologies 
towards a unified vision that would allow for the possibility of a qualitative leap in the human experience: 
The phrase “convergent technologies” refers to the synergistic combination of four major “NBIC” (nano-bio-info-cogno) 
provinces of science and technology, each of which is currently progressing at a rapid rate: (a) nanoscience  
and nanotechnology; (b) biotechnology and biomedicine, including genetic engineering; (c) information 
technology, including advanced computing and communications; and (d) cognitive science, including cognitive 
neuroscience ([56], pp. 1–2). 
Correspondingly, a summarizing motto found in its founding document reads: 
If the Cognitive Scientists can think it, 
the Nano people can build it, 
the Bio people can implement it, and 
the IT people can monitor and control it ([56], p. 13). 
46  Expressing a concern not dissimilar with cybernetic’s own during the 1940s ([57], pp. 2–3), a preoccupation with the 
wide separation existing between different areas of scientific research was expressed. The countervailing epistemic 
position would be that of a renaissance man (i.e., the polymath Leonardo Da Vinci). Accordingly, a new, unifying view 
is proposed: 
We stand at the threshold of a new renaissance in science and technology, based on a comprehensive understanding 
of the structure and behavior of matter from the nanoscale up to the most complex system yet discovered, the human 
brain…Developments in systems approaches, mathematics, and computation in conjunction with NBIC allow us for 
the first time to understand the natural world, human society, and scientific research as closely coupled complex, 
hierarchical systems. At this moment in the evolution of technical achievement, improvement of human 
performance through integration of technologies becomes possible ([56], p. 2. Emphasis added). 
47  As the founding, American document would suggest [56]. 
48  As the document produced by the European Union in response would propose [59]. For an account of the difference 
between the American and the European views on NBIC, see [60]. The Canadian stance was aligned with its American 
neighbor’s [61]. 
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might be witnessing the beginning of the technological feasibility for this “next” human. It would then 
seem then that the relevance of the humanities should be considered of utmost importance when facing 
indeed a new way of human existence: As a “biological citizen”, aware of its “neurochemical self”, 
and displaying “somatic expertise” with its own “biocapital”.49 Indeed, the renewed fostering of the 
humanities might be necessary for our very survival. If one is to thoroughly articulate the underlying 
humanistic impetus behind pervasively disruptive technologies, the input of the humanities could 
not only let itself be felt, but indeed guide the late scientific ethos towards human alteration into  
self-critical flourishing. 
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